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Abstract and  
Recommendations 
 
In June 2016, the Danish Parliament approved the procurement of 27 F-35 
fighter aircraft to replace the Royal Danish Air Force’s remaining fleet of 30 
operational F-16s. Scheduled for delivery between 2021 and 2026, the F-35 
acquisition is only the first of a number of decisions to be taken in the com-
ing years. Previous fighter aircraft acquisitions reveal three sets of risks and 
challenges inherent in such decisions. 
 The first set of risks concerns the building of a sufficient organizational 
structure around the aircraft so that they can perform the set of tasks ex-
pected by the Parliament. Adequate numbers of pilots, technicians, and 
flight engineers must be trained in time to fly and maintain the aircraft to 
meet the schedule for their delivery accepted by the Parliament. The facilities 
at Skrydstrup Air Base must also be ready to house, service, and protect the 
aircraft. 
 The second set of risks concerns the integration of the new aircraft in-
to the Royal Danish Air Force (RDAF) and the Danish armed forces more 
broadly. In the past, new aircraft enabled the RDAF to expand the types of 
tasks that it could perform, including how it interacted with the forces of the 
Royal Danish Navy and Army, and the forces of Denmark’s NATO allies. 
 The third set of risks arise from the possibility that the aircraft can be 
used in new ways to address currently unforeseeable security challenges. 
The F-16 fleet played a substantial role in enabling Danish leaders to re-
spond to changes in the international security environment after the Cold 
War. The F-35 will likely play a similarly fluid role over the course of its 40-
year life expectancy. 
 This report analyses these risks and challenges in light of Denmark’s 
experience with the F-16, the plans of its North European partners in the F-
35 programme, and the broader security environment for Danish defence 
policy. The report concludes with potential considerations for Danish policy 
makers. 
                                          
• Consider the risks inherent in recruiting, educating, training, and re-
taining sufficient numbers of pilots and maintenance personnel. 
• Consider retaining very experienced pilots as US-based instructors for a 
number of years in order to populate the new F-35 squadron with ex-
perienced pilots to the extent possible. 
• Consider the risks inherent in managing the flight hours remaining in 
the F-16 fleet in relation to potential demands for additional deploy-
ments to international operations, air policing missions, exercises, and 
the increased training requirements inherent in the transition to a new 
aircraft. 
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• Consider contingencies to remedy potential shortfalls in F-16 fleet 
flight hours. 
• Consider the possibility that additional aircraft may be required in the 
future. 
• Consider expediting the construction of new and refurbished facilities 
at Skrydstrup to avoid further delays in the acceptance of F-35s to 
Danish territory. 
• Consider a thorough risk assessment of the physical, electromagnetic, 
and cybersecurity measures planned for F-35 storage and information 
at Skrydstrup. 
• Consider the requirements for adjusting maintenance structures, pro-
cesses, and labour agreements to accommodate the cooperative mul-
tinational maintenance system of the F-35 programme. 
• Consider the geostrategic position of Skrydstrup Air Base relative to 
potential contingencies in the Baltic Sea region and implement appro-
priate capacities relative to national and NATO requirements, including 
options for ground-based air defence (GBAD) systems. 
• Consider increasing participation in Red Flag training exercises to de-
velop pilot competencies in high intensity, multinational air contingen-
cies. 
• Consider developing a regional exercise in the airspace over the North 
Sea to enhance training opportunities with other F-35 users in north-
ern Europe. 
• Consider the requirements for the integration of future Danish mari-
time and air power capabilities, including communications, sensors, 
command and control, and coordinating the firing of munitions. 
• Consider requesting Danish participation in multinational exercises in-
volving the United Kingdom and Norway to practice integrating air and 
maritime capabilities. 
• Consider future F-35 command and control (C2) arrangements togeth-
er with other European F-35 user nations to ensure the agile, flexible, 
and effective employment of the F-35 aircraft with its sensors, sensor 
fusion, and communication capabilities. 
• Consider including an air-launched strike missile that can be carried in 
the internal weapons bay of the F-35 in the investigation of ‘a poten-
tial future acquisition of long-range precision-guided missiles’ recom-
mended in the 2018 Defence Agreement. 
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Dansk resumé og  
anbefalinger  
 
Folketinget godkendte i juni 2016 anskaffelsen af 27 F-35 Joint Strike Figh-
ter-kampfly til Forsvaret. F-35-flyene leveres i perioden 2021-2026 og skal 
afløse Flyvevåbnets aldrende F-16-kampfly. Men beslutningen om anskaffel-
sen er kun den første af en række beslutninger, som skal tages i de kom-
mende år. Forsvaret forventer, at F-35-flyene er fuldt operative i 2027. Dan-
marks tidligere anskaffelse af kampfly har dog vist, at der er tre overordnede 
udfordringer forbundet med at integrere nye kampfly i Forsvaret. 
 Første udfordring er at sikre en tilstrækkelig robust personelstruktur til 
at vedligeholde og flyve flyene. Forsvaret har tidligere haft udfordringer på 
dette område, og netop i overgangen fra F-16 til F-35 vil Forsvaret være sær-
ligt sårbar over for personelmangel inden for pilot- og teknikerområdet. Tilli-
ge skal basefaciliteterne på Flyvestation Skrydstrup tilpasses og ombygges til 
de nye fly. 
 Anden udfordring er integration af de nye kampfly i Forsvarets struk-
tur. F-35 er et såkaldt femtegenerations-kampfly, som har en række nye, 
avancerede egenskaber, som Forsvaret skal arbejde med for at udnytte fuldt 
ud, ligesom da F-16-flyene blev integreret i 1980’erne. 
 Tredje udfordring er, at F-35-flyene giver nye anvendelsesmuligheder 
for kampfly i nationale og internationale operationer, hvilket også giver 
Danmark nye sikkerhedspolitiske muligheder. F-16-flyene blev opdateret og 
fik nye opgaver, da det danske forsvar blev omstillet efter ophøret af den 
kolde krig. Sandsynligvis vil F-35 også få nye opgaver igennem de ca. 40 år, 
flyene forventes anvendt i dansk forsvar. 
 Denne rapport analyserer disse udfordringer på baggrund af Danmarks 
erfaringer med F-16-kampflyet samt under hensyn til de erfaringer, Dan-
marks tre nordeuropæiske nabolande Norge, Holland og Storbritannien alle-
rede har gjort i deres F-35-implementering, som er tre til fem år forud for 
Danmarks. Rapporten afsluttes med en række anbefalinger til F-35-
implementeringsprocessen i Danmark og et antal sikkerhedspolitiske overve-
jelser. 
• Piloter og teknikere: Flyvevåbnet har historisk været udfordret af læn-
gere perioder med mangel på piloter og/eller teknikere. Særligt i over-
gangen fra F-16 til F-35 vil Flyvevåbnet være sårbart over for pilot- 
og/eller teknikermangel. Derfor bør et fortsat fokus være fastholdelse 
af erfarent personel og rekruttering samt uddannelse af nyt personel til 
Forsvarets kampfly. 
• F-16-flyvetimer: F-16-strukturen skal kunne opretholdes, således at na-
tionale opgaver – herunder afvisningsberedskabet – kan løses, indtil F-
35-flyene er operative. Desuden skal træning kunne udføres på F-16 
for at fastholde evnen til opgaveløsning. Dette betyder, at flyvetimer i 
de tilbageværende F-16-fly kan blive en kritisk ressource. Der bør der-
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for udarbejdes planer for at opretholde et tilstrækkeligt antal F-16-
flyvetimer, hvis der skulle opstå forsinkelser i F-35-integrationen. 
• Antal F-35-kampfly: I den politiske beslutning om kampflyanskaffelsen 
lægges der op til en politisk drøftelse omkring anskaffelse af de sidste 
seks fly, forud for indgåelse af kontrakt på disse fly. På dette tidspunkt 
kan det også overvejes, om Danmarks evt. bør anskaffe yderligere F-
35-kampfly for at sikre en mere robust kampflystruktur. 
• Faciliteter på Skrydstrup: Forsvarsministeriet har besluttet at opføre nye 
faciliteter til F-35-flyene på Flyvestation Skrydstrup. Disse faciliteter – 
inklusive fysiske og elektromagnetiske sikkerhedsforanstaltninger til at 
beskytte flyene – skal være færdiggjort, inden de første F-35 kan ope-
rere fra Skrydstrup. Færdiggørelse af disse faciliteter er derfor kritiske 
for rettidig integration af F-35. 
• Vedligeholdelse: Vedligeholdelsen af F-35 er radikalt anderledes end i 
relation til F-16, idet en række vedligeholdelsesopgaver vil blive gen-
nemført på internationale værkstedsfaciliteter i bl.a. Norge, Storbritan-
nien, Holland og Italien. Derfor må den nationale kampfly-
vedligeholdelsesstruktur tilpasses fra F-16 til F-35. 
• Skrydstrup som forstærkningsbase: Flyvestation Skrydstrup ligger cen-
tralt som F-35-operationsbase i forbindelse med en krise og/eller NA-
TO-krisestyringsoperation omkring Østersøen. Derfor bør der udarbej-
des planer for evt. modtagelse af udenlandske F-35-fly på flyvestatio-
nen i en sådan situation. 
• International F-35-træning: Der eksisterer et stort potentiale for for-
stærket internationalt trænings- og øvelsessamarbejde mellem nordeu-
ropæiske F-35-brugernationer. Luftrummet over Nordsøen er velegnet 
som trænings- og øvelsesområde for F-35-fly fra Norge, Storbritannien, 
Holland og Danmark. Desuden bør Danmark søge deltagelse i de plan-
lagte norske og britiske træningsaktiviteter mellem fly- og flådestyrker.  
Endvidere bør det overvejes at øge dansk deltagelse i Red Flag-øvelser 
for at træne multinationale luftoperationer i et højintensitetsmiljø. 
• Værnsfælles integration: F-35-flyet har potentiale til at kunne integre-
res tættere med enheder i Søværnet og Hæren end F-16-flyet pga. de 
omfattende sensorer og muligheden for elektronisk informationsde-
ling. Tiltag til en sådan integration og dens praktiske effekter for de to 
andre værn bør derfor indtænkes tidligt i integrationen.  
• Kommando og kontrol: I F-35-flyet vil piloten – pga. flyets avancerede 
sensorer – have et væsentligt bedre situationsbillede, end tilfældet er i 
F-16. Derfor bør gennemførelse af luftoperationer analyseres med 
henblik på – sammen med andre F-35-brugernationer – at undersøge 
mulighederne for at delegere en større grad af ansvar til piloten. Ved-
kommende vil ofte sidde med det bedste situationsbillede over opera-
tionsområdet. 
• Længererækkende præcisionsmissiler: I aftale på forsvarsområdet 
2018-2023 er det anført, at der skal gennemføres et analysearbejde 
for at undersøge behovet for anskaffelse af længererækkende præcisi-
onsmissiler. En sådan undersøgelse bør også omfatte en analyse af mu-
ligheder for at bevæbne F-35 med længererækkende præcisionsmissi-
ler, som f.eks. vil kunne medbringes internt i flyets våbenrum. 
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 Introduction 
 
On 9 June 2016, the Danish Parliament authorized the acquisition of 27 F-
35A Lightning II Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) aircraft.1 But parliamentary approval 
is only the beginning of the process to replace the military capability hitherto 
provided by Denmark’s ageing fleet of 30 operational F-16AM/BM Fighting 
Falcons. Before the first Danish pilot climbs aboard a Royal Danish Air Force 
F-35 at Skrydstrup Air Base to carry out the first mission, a number of related 
initiatives will be implemented. The purpose of this report is to identify and 
discuss the risks and challenges inherent in these decisions and initiatives by 
learning from the other countries that are acquiring the F-35 together with 
the historical experiences of the Royal Danish Air Force in its defence policy 
context. 
 We argue that Denmark is not acquiring combat aircraft per se, but ra-
ther a new military capability that requires more than hardware. It requires 
people, organization, processes, and guidance before the hardware can be 
used to achieve the objectives set for it by the Danish government. A previ-
ous CMS report analysed how Denmark addressed these requirements when 
it last acquired combat aircraft, the report finding that Denmark faced three 
sets of challenges: sufficiently resourcing the air force to use the aircraft ef-
fectively, mastering and adapting to the new capabilities enabled by the air-
craft, and taking advantage of these capabilities to adjust Danish defence 
policy to the requirements of a changing international security environment.2 
We utilize this framework to analyse some important aspects of what can be 
done to integrate the F-35 aircraft into the Danish defence structure. 
 The first set of risks concerns building a sufficient organizational struc-
ture around the aircraft so that they can perform the set of tasks expected 
by the Parliament. Adequate numbers of pilots, technicians, and flight engi-
neers must be trained in time to fly and maintain the aircraft according to 
the schedule for their delivery accepted by the Parliament. The facilities at 
Skrydstrup Air Base must also be ready to house, service, and protect the 
aircraft. Without such preparations, Denmark may not possess the capability 
to fulfil the tasks currently performed by the F-16 fleet. 
 The second set of risks concerns the integration of the new aircraft in-
to the Royal Danish Air Force (RDAF) and the Danish armed forces more 
broadly. In the past, new aircraft enabled the RDAF to expand the types of 
tasks that it could perform, including how it interacted with the Royal Dan-
ish Navy and Army, and the forces of Denmark’s NATO allies. These changes 
required subsequent adjustments in operational concepts, training regimes, 
and exercises. The Danish Defence will need to prepare to address these is-
sues if Denmark is to meet its security needs in the region and effectively 
address the expectations of its NATO allies. 
 The third set of risks arises from the possibility that the aircraft can be 
used in new ways to address currently unforeseeable security challenges. 
The F-16 fleet played an important role in enabling Danish leaders to be able 
to respond to changes in the international security environment after the 
Cold War. The F-35 will likely play a similarly fluid role over the course of its 
1 
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40-year life expectancy. It is unlikely that the security environment of today, 
and Denmark’s role and aspirations within it, will remain unchanged over 
the next four decades. The acquisition was based on the assumption that 
the F-35 would perform precisely the same roles and missions as the F-16 
fleet today. Changing conditions necessitate adaptation. For instance, the 
resurgence of Russian activity in the Baltic Sea region suggests that Den-
mark’s geographic position has regained particular importance, and the F-35 
force will likely play a key role in adapting to these changes. Furthermore, 
the multinational nature of the JSF programme will likely facilitate Danish ac-
tion in concert with others to adapt to these changes. The government 
should be prepared to quickly adjust its policies and practices to best adapt 
to these changes. 
 This report analyses these three sets of risks by reflecting on Denmark’s 
experience with the F-16 and the plans and policies of Denmark’s partners in 
the multinational F-35 JSF programme. In the following chapter, we provide 
a short overview of this programme and the plans of the United Kingdom, 
the Netherlands, and Norway to inform readers of their efforts to integrate 
the F-35 into their respective armed forces. These nations are three to five 
years ahead of Denmark in the implementation of their acquisition, meaning 
that they have experience that should be considered. We then turn to the 
risks that Denmark is likely to be challenged to handle to integrate the F-35 
into its air force, its armed forces, and its defence policy. The government 
has publicly acknowledged carefully considered plans to address some of 
these challenges.3 We analyse these plans in light of the Danish experience 
with the F-16, the plans of its JSF partners, and the broader security envi-
ronment for Danish defence policy. The final chapter of the report considers 
the match between plans and requirements for each of the risks that we 
have identified. We then provide suggestions and recommendations that 
can be considered by Danish policy makers as they undertake further deci-
sions to move beyond the type selection and integrate the F-35 into the 
Danish defence structure. 
 This report is produced in accordance with the guidelines in the Project 
Manual for the Centre for Military Studies and has been subjected to rigor-
ous internal and external peer review.4 Our sources are publicly available 
documents produced by government agencies in Denmark, the Netherlands, 
Norway, the United Kingdom, the United States, and the multinational Joint 
Program Office that manages the Joint Strike Fighter programme, as well as 
more general analyses and news reports that provide additional detail and 
context to specific areas of interest. We have spoken to several officials from 
these countries – including civil servants and military officers – as well as 
employees of private sector companies and researchers based in academia to 
place these documents in context and to provide a fuller understanding of 
their import. As always, however, the arguments presented in this report are 
those of the authors and not those of any government agency. 
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The JSF Programme and 
Denmark’s Partners 
 
The acquisition of the F-35 is the largest procurement programme in Danish 
military history, the culmination of almost 20 years of Danish participation in 
a multinational programme to develop and produce the aircraft. The pro-
gramme has enabled Denmark to join a group of its closest allies and con-
currently acquire the newest and most sophisticated fighter aircraft operated 
by the United States, which will permit Denmark to enjoy the potential ben-
efits of a large production run, cooperative maintenance sustainment pro-
grammes, and the interoperability that commonality brings over the next 
40–50 years. These arrangements both enable and constrain how Denmark 
can implement the programme. They also provide opportunity to examine 
the plans and policies of partners that are further along for lessons and po-
tential best practices. 
 This chapter briefly describes the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) programme 
and then analyses the implementation programmes of Denmark’s three 
northern European partner nations: the UK, the Netherlands, and Norway. 
We provide an overview of the number and type of aircraft that each part-
ner has chosen to acquire; when they plan to be delivered, initially opera-
tional, and fully operational; how they have approached the training of their 
pilots and maintenance personnel; their plans for participating in JSF 
maintenance; and any changes to their air base facilities that they have 
deemed necessary to accommodate the new aircraft. We argue that their 
plans and policies can help to set expectations regarding the shape and di-
mensions of the Danish F-35 implementation. 
 
2.1 The Joint Strike Fighter Programme 
The United States initiated the JSF programme 25 years ago to overcome 
three challenges facing Western militaries. The first was the ever-increasing 
cost of military hardware that incorporated increasingly advanced, military-
exclusive technology. The second challenge was the understanding that the 
affordability and effectiveness of collective defence amongst Western allied 
nations was undermined by the heterogeneity of military systems developed 
and produced by individual nations – particularly as technology increased the 
costs of research, development, testing, acquisition, operation, and sustain-
ment.5 Commonality, it was argued, would reduce costs through economies 
of scale and increase interoperability amongst allies, thereby enhancing both 
the quantity and quality of Western militaries. The third challenge was the 
ever-improving capabilities of potential adversaries that would have to be 
overcome for Western military equipment and modalities of operations to 
remain viable. The JSF programme has been shaped with each of these chal-
lenges in mind. 
 The JSF programme drew on the lessons of the multinational F-16 pro-
gramme that Denmark joined in 1974.6 The United States brought partners 
into the process earlier than in the case of the F-16 so that they could con-
2 
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tribute to defining the requirements of the aircraft, increase the likelihood 
that allies would acquire the aircraft, and to share the financial burden of 
development and production. The programme was successful in this regard. 
The US Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps, partner nations the United King-
dom, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Denmark, Turkey, Canada, and Aus-
tralia, and foreign military sales (FMS) customers Japan, South Korea, and Is-
rael are planning to acquire and operate a total of 3197 JSF aircraft in three 
variants – the conventional F-35A, the vertical short take-off and landing F-
35B, and the carrier-based F-35C.7 The number of aircraft that each country 
are planning to acquire is presented in Table 2.1. 8 In April 2018, the JSF pro-
ject completed the System Design and Development (SDD) phase, 9 and 300 
F-35 aircraft have been produced and delivered to eight JSF partner nations  
and FMS customers as of 11 June 2018. 10  
 
 
Table 2.1: JSF Procurement Quantities11 
United States 
Programme  
of Record 
Partner  
countries 
Programme  
of Record 
Foreign  
Military Sales 
Programme 
of Record 
US Air Force 1763 Denmark 27 Israel 50 
US Navy 273 Netherlands 37 Japan 42 
US Marines 420 Norway 52 South Korea  40 
  Canada 65   
  Italy 90   
  Australia 100   
  Turkey 100   
  UK 138   
US Total 2456 Partner Total 609 FMS Total 132 
 
 
The JSF Joint Program Office (JPO) provides the governing structure for the 
programme and includes all of the partner nations. The JPO aggregates the 
orders of the partners and, after negotiations with the industry consortium 
led by prime contractor Lockheed Martin, submits a single order for a ‘lot’ of 
aircraft each year. The JPO provides other governance functions, including 
developing sustainment arrangements with the partner nations to maintain 
the economies of scale that will reduce maintenance costs. The JPO will ag-
gregate all participant procurement requests for materiel and services ‘to the 
extent feasible’ to achieve economies of scale12 and coordinate the sharing 
of data associated with the fleets of aircraft operated by the programme 
partners to facilitate their efficient maintenance, modification, structural as-
sessment, and, ultimately, disposal.13 
 
2.2 Partner Plans  
The commonality encouraged and enforced by the JSF programme has not 
precluded differences in when the partners decided to acquire their aircraft, 
the number that they have chosen to buy, how they are integrating their air-
craft into their air forces, and the roles that they will play in securing their 
national security interests. Denmark’s regional partners – the UK, the Neth-
erlands, and Norway – made their investment decisions earlier and are there-
fore further along in implementing them. In the following pages, we discuss 
these plans and their differences to identify potential lessons for Danish de-
cision makers. 
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The United Kingdom is the largest partner in the programme, after the Unit-
ed States, and they plan to acquire two different models of the F-35: 48 of 
the F-35B model for the Royal Navy (RN) and likely 90 F-35As for the Royal 
Air Force (RAF), for a total of 138 aircraft.14 The UK received its first F-35B 
aircraft for testing and evaluation in 2012 and received its first aircraft in 
country in 2018. 15  The UK will operate these aircraft jointly, with the 
RAF/RN’s land-based F-35Bs reaching an initial operating capability (IOC) on 
31 December 2018, the sea-based F-35Bs reaching IOC in conjunction with 
the HMS Queen Elizabeth aircraft carrier in 2020, and each are to achieve 
full operating capability (FOC) in 2023.16 
 Before the Dutch Ministry of Defence or Parliament decided to select 
the F-35 to replace its F-16 fleet, the Netherlands acquired two early-
production aircraft to join the US and UK in its testing and evaluation.17 This 
investment enabled Dutch pilots and maintenance personnel to be more in-
volved with the programme when the aircraft were delivered in 2013.18 In 
September 2013, the Dutch chose to acquire a further 35 F-35As at a cost 
of EUR 4.5 billion, with financing for their first order approved by the Dutch 
Parliament on 26 February 2015.19 The first eight aircraft will be delivered in 
2019.20 The Dutch expect to declare IOC in 2021 and FOC in the third quar-
ter of 2024.21 At the same time, the Dutch will phase out the last of their 
current structure of 68 F-16 aircraft. 
 The Norwegian government selected the F-35A in November 2008.22 
They decided to acquire 52 F-35As in June 2012 at a cost of NOK 71.5 bil-
lion (approximately EUR 7.5 billion; 2017 values).23 The first two aircraft were 
delivered for training in the US in 2015, followed by two more in 2016.24 In 
early November 2017, Norway received three F-35As delivered directly to Ør-
land Main Air Station and by the end of 2017 had a total of 10 aircraft.25 
The Norwegians plan to reach IOC in 2019, to receive all 52 aircraft in 2024, 
and reach FOC 2025 in concert with their acquisition of P-8 maritime air-
craft.26 At the same time, Norway will phase out the last of their current 
structure of 56 F-16 aircraft. 
 Denmark will receive its first aircraft for US-based training in 2021 and 
its first aircraft will arrive in country in 2023.27 The remainder of the fleet will 
be delivered between 2022 and 2026. The partial Danish fleet of F-35s will 
achieve an equivalent of IOC in 2024 together with the phase-out of the last 
of the current 30 Danish operational F-16s. An equivalent of FOC will be 
reached in 2027, the year after the entire fleet of 21 aircraft intended for 
operations has arrived in Denmark.28 These partner programme milestones 
are compiled in Table 2.2 and Figure 2.1. 
 
 
Table 2.2: Key Milestones in F-35 partner Programmes 
 
 
These milestones show the timeline between the acquisition and full use of 
the aircraft. Much must be accomplished between these two endpoints for 
 Type  
Selection 
Current 
 F-16 
Number  
F-35 
1
st
 Aircraft 
Received 
1
st 
Delivered 
in Country 
IOC FOC 
UK 2001 Nil 138 2012 2018 2018/2020 2023 
Netherlands 2013 68 37 2013 2019 2021 2024 
Norway 2008 56 52 2015 2017 2019 2025 
Demark 2016 30 27 2021 2023 2024 2027 
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these nations to possess a usable military capability: pilots and maintenance 
personnel must be trained, facilities at air bases must be constructed, and a 
maintenance support structure must be established. These investments re-
quire programmatic decisions beyond the political decision to buy and pay 
for new aircraft. How well these countries invest in people, training, and fa-
cilities will determine the quality of the military forces that they will have 
available for use in military operations. 
 As can be seen, each partner plans to declare IOC once they possess 
around 20 aircraft, including those based in the United States for training 
purposes. These numbers are sufficient to form a squadron. Moreover, they 
plan to take 3–6 years to undertake the necessary steps to make that squad-
ron fully operational. Denmark and the Dutch each plan to make this transi-
tion within three years, while the UK plans on a five-year transition and the 
Norwegians have given themselves six years. 
 Denmark’s JSF programme partners will be further along in their im-
plementation processes. Each will declare IOC before or around the same 
time as Denmark receives its first aircraft, and the UK and the Netherlands 
plan to declare FOC prior to the Danish declaration of IOC. These countries 
will probably gain experience that the RDAF can draw upon to smooth its 
own implementation of the programme and move as planned from IOC to 
FOC. 
 
 
Figure 2.1: Northern European F-35 Deliveries and Milestones 
 
 
 
 
2.3 Partner Training 
Training for pilots and maintenance personnel for the F-35 is centralized and 
located in the United States. The British, Dutch, and Norwegians have em-
bedded equipment and significant numbers of personnel in American 
squadrons to facilitate the initial training of their personnel. Around 10 
Integrating the F-35 into Danish Defence · Centre for Military Studies · University of Copenhagen  page 11  
 
 
months are required to train a new F-35 pilot, whereas the instruction nec-
essary to convert a pilot with 500 hours in another fighter jet type is approx-
imately four months.29 Countries are training personnel with mixed experi-
ence levels as they introduce the F-35 into their inventories. 
The UK embedded eight F-35Bs and 140 personnel within the US Marine 
Corps F-35B training squadron in Beaufort, SC. These personnel formed the 
core of the UK’s first operational F-35 squadron before relocating to RAF 
Marham in Norfolk, England in mid-2018 to prepare for IOC.30 The remain-
ing US-based personnel will form the core of an operational conversion unit 
that will redeploy to the UK in mid-2019 to assume responsibility for training 
RAF and RN pilots in the F-35.31 By 2023, the UK will have trained a suffi-
cient number of pilots to man a second operational squadron.32 
 The Dutch established their first F-35 squadron on 10 May 2014 at 
Eglin Air Force Base in the United States to test and evaluate the two F-35As 
that they had acquired.33 The detachment of about 35 personnel works 
alongside American and British units, each responsible for their own air-
craft.34 The first four pilots and 20 maintenance personnel for the squadron 
began their F-35 training in November 2013.35 The RNLAF are planning to 
have established a sufficient cadre of trained instructor pilots to man their 
own training squadron at the multi-national F-35A Pilot Training Center at 
Luke Air Force Base in the United States in 2019 and will retain that capabil-
ity permanently.36 The RNLAF will retain eight F-35s at Luke AFB during the 
conversion from the F-16 to the F-35. To facilitate this conversion, the Dutch 
deployed six F-16s to train with F-35s at the USAF Red Flag exercise in 2017 
to prepare to integrate the F-35 into their fleet, where it will operate along-
side the F-16.37 
 Norway established a small F-35 unit at Luke AFB in the autumn of 
2015 to receive the first F-35s and conduct conversion training for pilots and 
maintenance personnel. The Norwegian unit integrated into the American, 
Australian, and Italian multinational F-35 conversion unit, which pools their 
resources and facilitates cooperation between partner nations.38 These Nor-
wegian personnel formed the core of Norway’s first F-35 squadron when 
the first Norwegian aircraft landed in Ørland in November 2017.39 
 
2.4 Partner Maintenance 
One of the intended benefits of the JSF programme is to enable partner na-
tions to share in common sustainment that takes advantage of the econo-
mies of scale inherent in a large aircraft fleet. The JSF JPO will aggregate all 
of the participant procurement requests for materiel and services ‘to the ex-
tent feasible’ to achieve economies of scale.40 As the Danish Rigsrevisionen 
notes, 
 
This means that the Ministry of Defence owns the actual combat plane 
while components, spare parts, and support equipment are owned by 
the JSF programme through a global spare parts pool. The purpose is 
to minimize maintenance costs, because many users may agree on a 
relatively smaller reserve and joint purchase of spare parts.41 
 
In this way, the JSF programme implements the spirit of NATO Smart De-
fence, through which ‘Allies are encouraged to work together to develop, 
acquire, operate and maintain military capabilities.42 
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The JPO has divided the world into three zones – North America, Europe, 
and the Asia–Pacific region – and is establishing regional hubs for airframe, 
engine, and various component work.43 By establishing regional hubs for 
maintenance work, the JSF programme intends to spare partners the neces-
sity of establishing their own facilities and generate efficiencies through 
shared sustainment.44 In Europe, different partners have bid for and been 
awarded different roles in F-35 maintenance for the region. Italy will provide 
Europe’s heavy airframe maintenance out of the final assembly and check-
out (FACO) facility in Cameri.45 The UK will provide maintenance, repair, and 
overhaul and upgrade services for F-35 avionics and aircraft components.46 
Turkey, Norway, and the Netherlands will establish depots for heavy engine 
work.47 The Netherlands will also house the central storage facility for all F-
35 parts in Europe.48 There are no plans to locate such facilities in Denmark. 
 Beyond this distributed global maintenance arrangement, each nation 
should prepare its own national maintenance structure at the wing or 
squadron level to handle day-to-day maintenance and ground support for 
the aircraft. Training of these maintenance personnel takes place at Eglin Air 
Force Base in Florida, and many partners will likely develop their own train-
ing programmes in the future.49 
 
2.5 Partner Basing 
The acquisition of new fighter aircraft provides both the opportunity and ne-
cessity to refurbish, upgrade, and construct anew the facilities required for 
proper basing. Every airfield at which the F-35 will be based will undergo 
improvements, from resurfacing runways, rebuilding and reconfiguring 
maintenance bays, building secure facilities for highly sensitive technology 
and information, increasing the physical security of the base, to accommo-
dating the needs of the local community. 
 In the UK, new management, maintenance, training, and operational 
facilities will be constructed at RAF Marham. Its utilities and power supplies 
will be replaced and upgraded, and airfield operating surfaces will be refur-
bished to adapt to the vertical take-off and landing capabilities of the F-35B, 
at a cost of over £500 million (approximately EUR 562 million).50 Most of this 
work was completed by the end of 2017 to accommodate the arrival of the 
first F-35s. The Ministry of Defence conducted an assessment of the poten-
tial noise amelioration measures required to meet UK environmental regula-
tions from 1 April 2011 to 1 March 2012. That assessment will provide a 
baseline against which to compare noise from the F-35 after the F-35Bs ar-
rive in 2018.51 Plans for meeting the regulatory requirements are being final-
ized given these assessments. The USAF has also announced that it will re-
place the permanently deployed F-15 Strike Eagle force at RAF Lakenheath 
with two squadrons of USAF F-35A aircraft beginning in 2021.52 Laken-
heath’s facilities will require substantial effort to accommodate these air-
craft, with the destruction of current facilities begun in 2018 and new con-
struction to begin in 2019.53 
 The Dutch plan to operate their F-35s from two air bases: Leeuwarden 
from 2021 and Volkel from 2025.54 Both require significant infrastructure 
upgrades, including the construction of new secure facilities and an audito-
rium – facilities that the Dutch hope will also enable them to establish a cen-
tre of excellence for European F-35 operating nations as well as a F-35 
Fighter Weapons School, perhaps in cooperation with Norway and the UK.55 
In May 2016, the RNLAF deployed their two F-35 test aircraft to Leeuwarden 
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to assess operations in existing hardened shelters and noise levels around 
Leeuwarden and Volkel.56 The Dutch Parliament has advised the government 
to establish a permanent noise monitoring system for these bases.57 
In Norway, the transition from the F-16 to the F-35 involves establishing Ør-
land as the RNOAF’s primary fighter base and using Evenes Air Base in the 
north of Norway as a Forward Operating Base (FOB), primarily for quick reac-
tion alerts (QRA) in the High North.58 Evenes will also be the main operating 
base for the new RNOAF fleet of five P-8 Poseidon maritime patrol aircraft, 
which are scheduled for delivery in 2022.59 Norway plans to upgrade both 
bases to accommodate the F-35 at a cost of NOK 3–3.5 billion (approximate-
ly EUR 313–366 million).60 Furthermore, the United States will invest $10.3 
million to build a QRA landing pad and shelter for four aircraft at Rygge Air 
Station south of Oslo,61 and Norway will invest in ground-based air defences 
to protect their air bases, critical infrastructure, and support areas from at-
tack.62 Given its new functional missions, the Norwegian government also 
conducted new noise assessments at Evenes, which put an additional 29 pri-
vate buildings within a zone requiring amelioration.63 The Norwegians have 
not conducted any noise assessment at Ørland, 64  but the Institute for 
Transport Economics conducted a systems analysis of options for reducing 
noise levels to comply with Norwegian regulations.65 As of April 2016, the 
Norwegian MoD decided to appropriate 35 properties at a cost of NOK 86 
million (approximately EUR 9 million) and have offered to buy another 176 
houses in the community around Ørland airbase and to provide sound insu-
lation for another 800 in order to comply with environmental regulations.66 
 
2.6 Programme and Partners Conclusion 
The JSF is the largest and most comprehensive multinational weapons sys-
tem programme ever attempted, involving nine partner nations that have 
committed to jointly develop and then acquire over 3000 aircraft and share 
in a global logistics, maintenance, and sustainment enterprise over a 60-year 
period.67 The programme provides for potential economies of scale and the 
opportunity for partners to collaborate and coordinate with one another in 
the utilization of their aircraft. It also provides opportunity to compare, con-
trast, and derive implications from the challenges facing each partner in de-
veloping an institutional structure around this new capability. 
 Denmark’s allies – the UK, Netherlands, and Norway – made their re-
spective decisions to acquire the F-35 some years before Denmark and have 
therefore already addressed many of these challenges. The UK and Norway 
have incorporated a maritime dimension into their basing and manning 
plans. They have embedded their first F-35 aircraft in US-led units to facili-
tate the testing and evaluation of systems, as well as the training of their pi-
lots and maintenance personnel. These countries have also developed plans 
for transitioning their training units back to the home country once their ini-
tial cadre of pilots has been developed. They were able to make proposals to 
implement portions of the global maintenance and sustainment pro-
grammes in their nations, thereby securing jobs for their citizens and income 
for their economies as well as facilitating the development of expertise and 
comparative advantage across the partners. Finally, they have also begun the 
task of upgrading their air bases to accommodate the F-35, including as-
sessing and ameliorating its impact on local communities. Both Norway and 
the UK have completed training of an initial cadre of pilots and technicians 
in the US and deployed their first F-35 aircraft to their homeland on sched-
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ule to commence the build-up of their first F-35 squadron. The Netherlands 
plans to do likewise in the beginning of 2020. 
 The Dutch and Norwegian implementation plans are interesting from a 
Danish perspective, as they are both converting their F-16 structure to that 
for the F-35. Here, the Dutch choice to purchase two early production mod-
els to participate in the F-35 Early Operational Testing and Evaluation 
(EOT&E) allowed them to obtain early organizational knowledge and experi-
ence that enabled a more rapid 4-year transition from the F-16 to F-35 while 
still maintaining the full operational capability of their F-16 structure until 
their F-35 FOC. Furthermore, the Dutch reduction from 68 F-16s to 37 F-35s 
enables a robust organization that can maintain a fully operational F-16 fleet 
– and fully available for international operations68 until the F-35 FOC. The 
Norwegians have chosen a slower implementation as they – like the Danes – 
will convert their entire F-16 structure to the F-35, thus having to balance 
the organization between two aircraft types simultaneously. The Dutch and 
Norwegians have also chosen to inform the public extensively about their re-
spective F-35 programmes, the Dutch through semi-annual reports to par-
liament and the Norwegians through a variety of government and defence 
websites and social media.69 
 Because these nations began their transitions to the F-35 before Den-
mark, their experiences and plans provide valuable input to the Danish gov-
ernment. The following chapter reflects on these experiences together with 
open source literature and our discussions with relevant stakeholders to con-
sider the options available and to prepare tentative suggestions regarding 
the actions that may be undertaken in the future. 
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Danish Integration Risks 
and Challenges  
 
What are the possible risks and challenges facing the Royal Danish Air Force 
as the F-35 is integrated into the Danish armed forces? Some of them are 
practical and are related to concrete implementation and project-
management issues. Others are more abstract in that the new capability 
opens up for new forms of cooperation, such as ‘increased jointness’ across 
the armed forces or with international partners. 
 One of the challenges concerns how to phase out the current fleet of 
F-16 AM/BM combat aircraft while continuing to meet Danish national secu-
rity policy requirements. Moreover, the current cadre of F-16 pilots will con-
tinue to maintain their current qualifications while some of them transition 
to the F-35. A new cadre of pilots will be recruited and trained to fly the F-
35. This applies to maintenance as well: the current personnel will continue 
to work on the F-16 while some undergo F-35 training together with a new 
cadre of maintenance workers. The process of integrating the F-35 into the 
RDAF will also require modifying, refurbishing, rebuilding, and building a 
new hangar, maintenance, and other facilities at Skrydstrup Air Base. 
 The challenges involved in integrating the new aircraft go beyond 
these technical decisions. The Danish F-16 experience suggests that the inte-
gration of a new combat aircraft will affect more than the dimensions of the 
RDAF. As Lieutenant General MALT Nielsen, the Vice Chief of Defence and 
former Chief of the Air Staff, explains, ‘our primary focus for the coming 
years is the successful implementation of the F-35. In this process it is essen-
tial that we do not force the F-35 to fit into the Royal Danish Air Force as is, 
but rather seek to make the combined Danish armed forces fit to benefit 
from the F-35’.70 Thus the three services will likely be encouraged to capital-
ize on the investment in the F-35 and use its capabilities to strengthen joint-
ness in the Danish Defence. 
 Finally, we argue that the multinational nature of the JSF programme 
provides a platform for Danish policy makers to improve international coop-
eration with other F-35 user nations. Such cooperation may better enable 
Denmark to achieve future goals in Danish defence policy together with 
Denmark’s allies and partners, whether in defence of the Kingdom of Den-
mark itself (including Greenland and the Faroe Islands), its allies in Europe, or 
its broader interests and values in the world abroad. 
 In this chapter, we analyse these three sets of risks and challenges in 
the context of the plans and policies that the Danish government has thus 
far made public by reflecting on the Danish experience with the F-16 and 
the actions and intentions of Denmark’s JSF partners, as discussed in the 
previous chapter. This analysis sets the stage for the suggestions and rec-
ommendations in the next chapter. 
 
 
 
 
3 
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3.1 Aircraft, Pilots, Maintenance, and Facilities 
  
 Aircraft 
On 9 June 2016, the Danish Parliament approved the acquisition of 27 JSF F-
35s for the RDAF. The total reflected the government recommendation, 
which ‘assumed a continuation of the current tasks and level of ambition of 
the Danish F-16 fighter capability’ as the baseline against which all require-
ments would be set.71 
 
This means … [an ability] to conduct: National tasks involved with 
maintaining a permanent quick reaction alert capability which can per-
form tasks involving surveillance and defending sovereignty and which 
can be scrambled with extremely short notice … international opera-
tions and NATO’s collective defence tasks with a fighter contribution 
on [a] high alert state in which four fighters can be deployed for a pe-
riod of up to 12 months every third year [as well as] periodic fighter 
contributions to NATO Air Policing missions.72 
 
In its approval of the acquisition, the Danish Parliament indicated that it ‘is 
expected that the last F-16 aircraft will be phased out by the end of 2024. 
The phasing in of the Joint Strike Fighter aircraft is expected to take place 
over a period of six years (2021–2026)’.73 The agreement specifies the num-
ber of F-35s to be added to the RDAF inventory each year.74 IOC will take 
place in 2024, when the RDAF has 11–15 F-35s at Skrydstrup and they can 
begin to assume responsibility for quick reaction alerts (QRAs). FOC will take 
place in 2027 once the full complement of 21 aircraft are in the country. 
Although some commentators have expressed concern that delays associat-
ed with developing component systems for the aircraft may delay delivery to 
Denmark,75 such delays are unlikely76 
 The current RDAF F-16 inventory numbers 43 aircraft, 30 of which are 
operational.77 Between 2017 and 2024, the fleet will be reduced as aircraft 
are retired. The specifics of how many aircraft and when they will be retired 
throughout this period depend on how the fleet is used and managed. It has 
been recognized that the total number of aircraft and their remaining flying 
hours are sufficient to allow the RDAF’s pilot cadre to meet their training re-
quirements and maintain a QRA force of 2–4 aircraft to defend Danish air-
space. The remaining fleet is also sufficient to conduct one more six-month 
deployment for an international operation (four aircraft, plus two or three in 
reserve) and one more air policing mission (two aircraft, plus one or two in 
reserve) or lesser international mission between now and 2022.78 Although 
the Finance Act for the aircraft indicates that gaps in the ability to conduct 
these missions will occur, beginning in 2022, the government scheduled the 
air policing mission for the Baltic states for January– April 2018.79 This means 
that from the time of writing until 2022, Denmark can choose to use its 
combat aircraft in only one more international operation or two internation-
al air policing deployments. After that, the RDAF will probably not have suf-
ficient aircraft to conduct either an air policing or an international operation 
– at least under peacetime conditions – until 2025. Flying more would ‘sig-
nificantly increase risks’ such that ‘by the end of 2023, the number of F-16s 
that would be ready to fly would be so low that the national defence could 
not be maintained by the F-16s alone’.80 This gap in the Danish military 
toolbox is significant, particularly given the frequency with which Danish po-
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litical leaders have chosen to deploy the F-16 force to visibly exercise Den-
mark’s activist foreign and security policy.81 
 These conditions, as well as the estimated maximum readiness rate of 
70 per cent assumed in the Ministry’s 2016 assessment of potential efficien-
cies in the F-16 fleet,82 suggest a drawdown curve that maximizes the num-
ber of F-16s available for as long as possible along the lines indicated in Fig-
ure 3.1a.83 
 
 
 
 
 
 Pilots and Technicians  
Aircraft – even 5th generation aircraft – do not fly themselves. Historically, 
Denmark has faced shortages of personnel, particularly pilots, when transi-
tioning from one aircraft type to another.84 For instance, Denmark was short 
F-16 pilots from the mid-1980s until 2006–07, when the number of opera-
tional F-16s was reduced from 60 to 48 aircraft.85 Without this reduction, 
the RDAF would have continued to lack pilots to man its operational fleet. 
The Defence Agreement for 2013–2017 further reduced the operational F-
16 fleet to 30; and with it, the number of pilots required to man them.86 To-
day, approximately 50 pilots man these aircraft.87 Current practice, as well as 
the Ministry of Defence’s own Analyse af Forsvarets Kampflykapacitet, sug-
gests that this combination of 50 pilots and 30 aircraft is the standard for 
achieving the level of ambition set by Parliament for the F-16 fleet.88 This has 
also become the standard for the number of F-35s and pilots required to 
continue to achieve this level of ambition. Beyond the number of operational 
pilots assigned to fly F-16s from Skrydstrup on a daily basis and to deploy on 
international operations when called upon, the RDAF also has a number of 
pilots with previous F-16 experience assigned to different staff positions. If 
necessary, some of these pilots could be brought back to operational sta-
tus.89 A MoD study to dimension the RDAF to 27 F-35s concluded that 70 pi-
lots were required.90 The MoD has since indicated that it will reduce that 
number to 62 to ‘contribute to a smoother transition … to the F-35 pilot 
structure’.91 
 Denmark will first be able to begin training its F-35 pilots in 2021, 
when the first Danish aircraft is delivered to Luke Air Force Base in Arizona 
as JSF nations are required to provide their own aircraft for training.92 To 
prepare for the transition, the RDAF will likely attempt to train as many pilots 
as the remaining flight hours in the F-16 fleet allow to ensure a large pool of 
qualified pilots – the required 62 and some surplus to account for regular at-
No international 
missions 
Figure 3.1a: Anticipated RDAF 
Fighter  Inventory 
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trition from retirements and other factors. Training more F-16 pilots now will 
enable more pilots to be trained more quickly in the F-35. Experienced F-16 
pilots will be able to take advantage of their knowledge of fighter aircraft 
operations and transition to the F-35 by completing a four-month course.93 
In contrast, training a pilot on the F-35 ‘from scratch’ requires around 10 
months. Preparing a surplus of pilots in 2018–2020 would make the most of 
the limited number of training aircraft that Denmark will possess in 2021–
2022. Sufficient numbers of JSF pilots should be available to man the squad-
ron at Skrydstrup in 2022 to prepare for the arrival of the first aircraft at the 
end of that year.94 
 Maintenance personnel are also required to keep aircraft operational. 
Denmark has historically faced challenges retaining its qualified aircraft me-
chanics and technicians, and a shortage led to a halt in pilot training in 
2007.95 The limitations that their capacity would have on sustaining lengthy 
deployments were known before Danish F-16s were deployed to support air 
operations against the Islamic State in October 2014.96 This became a topic 
of discussion in Danish media and with top American defence officials, who 
were concerned about the ability of Denmark to sustain a small deployment 
of four fighter aircraft when they were withdrawn in September 2015.97 
 According to the Analyse af Forsvarets Kampflykapacitet study, the 
two F-16 squadrons at Skrydstrup were staffed by 421 maintenance person-
nel, including 184 flight engineers, 52 electronics mechanics, and various 
other specialties.98 A report providing possible solutions to the challenges of 
recruiting and retaining maintenance personnel indicates that from August 
2011 to August 2014, the equivalent of 535–536 personnel were assigned 
to the F-16 wing at Skrydstrup, this number increasing to 625 in August 
2015 when seven F-16 aircraft were deployed to support Operation Inherent 
Resolve.99 
 While current practice for the F-16 fleet is suggestive of requirements 
for the F-35, it is not determinative. Changes in how the F-35s will be main-
tained – in particular, the establishment of regional hubs for major mainte-
nance work that will spare Denmark the necessity of investing its resources 
to duplicate these capacities – may reduce the required number of mainte-
nance personnel.100 
 Regardless of the specific number of mechanics required, a significant 
cadre should be trained to maintain the F-35. This will require time. Accord-
ing to Jesper K. Hansen, Chairman of the Central Organization for Cadres, 
‘[i]t takes 4–5 years to train a maintenance engineer at the level now re-
quired. Hiring more is not easy’.101 Given the required investment and poten-
tial training pipeline, the RDAF estimates that it will take 10 years to train 
300 technicians for the F-35.102 Unlike pilot training, it is possible to begin 
training flight engineers and maintenance technicians before Denmark owns 
a single F-35 aircraft. Such training could first begin once Parliament ratified 
the government decision in 2016 regarding the type of aircraft to be ac-
quired.103 Thus, at best, the 300th maintenance technician will be fully trained 
in 2026, when the 21st F-35 arrives in Denmark. 
 
 Facilities at Skrydstrup 
Skrydstrup has been Denmark’s primary fighter aircraft base since the first F-
16 squadron was stationed there in 1980. It became the only fighter aircraft 
base after the 2004 Defence Agreement. In 2016, the Danish Parliament 
agreed that the base would transition to the F-35 and that its facilities ‘will 
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be rebuilt and prepared to receive’ the aircraft.104 The Ministry has indicted 
that this process will locate ‘workshops, garages, warehouses, and logistics 
planning … in one place … in order to achieve greater integration and ef-
fectiveness of the operational activities and logistical support’.105 Costs were 
estimated at DKK 400 million (approximately EUR 53.7 million) when the 
Parliament approved the acquisition. The MoD based its estimated require-
ments on the facilities at Luke Air Force Base, the American base where in-
ternational JSF training is located.106 These estimates focused on floor space 
and excluded areas such as refuelling systems, noise protection, and security 
measures. Furthermore, at the time that the proposal was approved, the 
MoD had yet to undertake the structural engineering feasibility study that 
would enable a cost estimate better tailored to Skrydstrup’s existing facili-
ties. Finally, the Ministry noted that the ‘site activation process’ pursued by a 
team from the JPO and Lockheed Martin would begin in October 2016.107 
This ongoing process will result in ‘a detailed review of existing facilities and 
plans for new buildings’ to ensure that all of the standards required for bas-
ing the F-35 in partner countries are followed.108 
 The picture has become clearer as this process has been implemented 
and the Norwegian, Dutch, and American experiences have become known. 
The Ministry has twice increased the budget to address the key areas of new 
hangars, measures to reduce noise for the surrounding community, and in-
creased air base security. These increases amount to DKK 460 million (ap-
proximately EUR 61.7 million),109 more than doubling the initial amount ap-
proved by the Danish Parliament for this purpose.  
 The Skrydstrup hangar facilities clearly have to be modified, rebuilt, or 
constructed anew to accommodate the F-35. In Norway, the planning and 
construction of new hangars at Ørland was not completed on time. The 
Norwegians first decided in mid-2017 to construct ‘robust’ hangars to per-
manently house their F-35s at a cost of NOK 2.26 billion (approximately EUR 
236 million). The hangars will not be completed until 2020, by which time 
22 of the new aircraft will have been delivered.110 Until then, the Norwe-
gians will house their F-35s in temporary plastic tents, having approved per-
manent structures late in their planning process. 
 On the other hand, the British, Dutch, Norwegians, and Americans111 
have taken a more pro-active approach to dealing with the potential nui-
sance that the noise generated by the F-35 may cause the local communi-
ties. Although studies of noise have been made in the Skrydstrup area,112 no 
formal tests involving F-35 aircraft have been conducted. The MoD report113 
released in December 2017, after significant media coverage of future F-35 
noise problems in the Skrydstrup area, indicated that at least 41 private 
homes would be affected by increased noise levels caused by the F-35.114 
The MoD has indicated that additional noise level assessments will be under-
taken and that the initial plans for locating facilities at Skrydstrup have been 
reconsidered.115 As Danish plans have evolved, the schedule for completing 
modifications to Skrydstrup have also slipped by an additional 6–12 months, 
potentially delaying the arrival of the first F-35 in Denmark until 2023.116 The 
extent and cost of policies for complying with Danish regulations regarding 
noise pollution are as yet unknown. 
 Security measures will also be substantially increased for the areas 
housing the aircraft and their information systems, as they will have highly-
classified mission files, sensor data, and logistics information that belong to 
the larger JSF programme. ‘The F-35 is more supercomputer than bomb 
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truck – it is a flying data hub … But that capability presents a new set of 
challenges: protecting sensitive technology and sovereign information 
shared between international operators over the aircraft’s vast network’.117 
Each F-35 and each F-35 base will be rich in classified and sensitive infor-
mation that will require protection from the efforts of unfriendly intelligence 
agencies.118 
 Danish security measures will have to meet standards set by the JPO 
and NATO, and – beyond protecting the base from a direct attack by an op-
posing military force – will necessarily include controlling physical access to 
sensitive areas of the air base, monitoring access to areas beyond the base 
(where aircraft will approach for take-off and landing), measures against 
drones (both for surveillance and the physical impediment of air opera-
tions),119 cybersecurity measures, and hardening against electronic warfare 
threats.120 It is important to understand that there will be sensitive areas be-
yond the property of the base, and security will entail measures that the lo-
cal community has not seen since the Cold War. 
 
 Aircraft, Personnel, and Facilities: An Interim Conclusion 
Implementing a programme as large as the acquisition of a new combat air-
craft fleet is a challenging and daunting prospect. Dividing the project into 
manageable parts eases the burden of accomplishing any one, but these 
should be adequately synchronized and brought to fruition simultaneously 
for the project to be successful. The prospect of recruiting, training, and re-
taining sufficient numbers of highly-trained personnel – pilots, flight engi-
neers, electronics technicians, and others – poses a challenge for the Danish 
defence personnel system. Ensuring that there is sufficient space in the train-
ing programmes that will be utilized to instil the complex of competencies 
required for these personnel requires deft diplomatic relations with partner 
countries within the JSF programme, particularly the United States, and 
these partners may have their own considerations and constraints to man-
age. Ensuring that the construction of facilities occurs on schedule and to 
the required specifications entails coordinating many agencies and authori-
ties in Denmark on the local, municipal, and national levels across multiple 
issue areas (e.g. environmental, construction, and labour) as well as negoti-
ating with and overseeing the private sector companies that will undertake 
the actual work. This also relates to the JSF programme standards, including 
security requirements that go beyond those of normal civilian, and even mili-
tary, facilities. All in all, the government has a challenging series of tasks 
ahead to administer this complex programme. 
 Figure 3.1b provides an overview of many of the lines of operation en-
tailed in the implementation of the F-35, most of which should be complet-
ed before the first aircraft lands on Danish soil in late 2022. The graph high-
lights that the years between 2022 and 2025 will see the transition from the 
F-16 to the F-35, which is where the greatest security risk exists for Den-
mark. Planning carefully for this transition is therefore quite necessary, par-
ticularly since it leads to the transition from IOC to FOC, which Denmark is 
planning to make more quickly and with fewer resources than its partners in 
the UK and Norway. While we have not placed units on the vertical axis, it 
notionally captures the number of men, aircraft, and facilities that will be 
transitioned from the F-16 programme to the F-35 across the period consid-
ered. 
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Figure 3.1b: Lines of Effort to Implement The F-35 
 
 
 
3.2 New RDAF Missions, Jointness, and Danish Defence Policy 
 
 New RDAF Missions 
When Denmark decided in 1975 to acquire the F-16, it was a front-line state 
facing the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact states of Poland and East Germany 
to the east and south. The RDAF was tasked with contributing to the de-
fence of Danish territory in peacetime and in the event of a general Europe-
an conflict through a focus on air-to-air engagement (counter air) and air-to-
ground support of forces in the littorals of the Danish coastline (TASMO, or 
tactical air support for maritime operations) within the context of NATO.121 
When Denmark’s national security strategy shifted after the Cold War to 
support expeditionary operations in the European periphery, the missions as-
signed to the RDAF shifted to intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance 
(ISR); strike, coordination, and reconnaissance (SCAR); and close air support 
(CAS) in uncontested environments.122 
 Danish national security policy has recently begun emphasizing poten-
tial operations closer to home. Ambassador Taksøe-Jensen’s report,123 the 
government’s Foreign and Security Policy Strategy,124 and the Danish De-
fence Agreement 2018–2023 emphasize that ‘[t]owards the east NATO fac-
es a challenging and more assertive Russia’.125 The primary scenario that 
NATO nations are planning against in the region is the defence or liberation 
of the three Baltic states, which: 
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can easily be isolated from the rest of NATO by Russian land, maritime 
and air forces. Russia has a favorable strategic position from which to 
deter NATO intervention on land … [Furthermore] Russia can make … 
reinforcement difficult, effectively dominating large areas of the Baltic 
and Baltic airspace using missile forces based in the Leningrad and Ka-
liningrad oblasts. Mines and submarines – the traditional means of 
controlling access to the Baltic – would complement these anti-access 
[and] area denial (A2/AD) capabilities.126 
 
NATO’s primary counter to this scenario will be a high-intensity air campaign 
to disable Russian A2/AD capabilities in the eastern Baltic to ensure NATO 
sea-lanes of communication to the Baltic states. Denmark could very well be 
a primary base of operations in such a campaign. Denmark is the closest JSF 
partner to the Baltic states, and only Skrydstrup places F-35s within unrefu-
elled range of them. It is therefore reasonable to expect the RDAF to be 
called upon to participate in such a campaign. As Vice Chief of Defence 
Lieutenant General MALT Nielsen has explained, ‘It is paramount that we 
utilize the F-35’s 5th generation capabilities for the greater good of NATO as 
a whole … the F-35 will be the new spearhead to take on the most chal-
lenging tasks in the air and confront enemy air defences’.127 The MoD evalu-
ation of the potential candidates to replace the F-16 fleet emphasized the 
ability of the aircraft to perform air interdiction (AI), suppression of enemy 
air defence (SEAD), and destruction of enemy air defence (DEAD) missions – 
likely for this very reason.128 For Baltic Sea security, Denmark will once again 
be a frontline state in terms of airpower. 
 But pilots require additional training for such missions. As journalist 
Steffen McGhie has noted, AI, SEAD, and DEAD ‘are far from the typical 
missions of the Danish Air Force’ today.129 Danish air operations have taken 
place in relatively benign, uncontested environments in which the adversary 
lacked an effective capability to defend themselves.130 Operating over the 
Baltic Sea against the advanced Russian A2/AD capabilities is a far more 
dangerous endeavour and will require extensive training. Denmark has par-
ticipated in the USAF Red Flag training exercises to develop competencies in 
new mission areas over the past 30 years, but the limited flight hours re-
maining in the F-16 fleet likely precludes participation in such exercises until 
the full complement of F-35s arrive (i.e., after 2026). This suggests that Dan-
ish pilot training will have less of a basis than desired for those who will con-
vert from the F-16 to the F-35 – and the RDAF may have to play catch-up 
relative to its partners. 
 Beyond training for new mission types, analysts have argued that the 
F-35 will enable new operational concepts that will have to be worked 
through and trained against.131 These will entail something more than using 
the F-35 as a ‘Super F-16’132 that is ‘able to perform the traditional role of a 
tactical strike fighter more effectively than ever before … [given] its unprec-
edented situational-awareness capabilities … “alone and unafraid” as part 
of a small formation in enemy territory’.133 Future operational concepts be-
ing developed by Danish partners entail utilizing the F-35 as a ‘shooter-
sensor’134 within a larger ‘battle network’135 to develop ‘distributed lethali-
ty’.136 The purported ability of the F-35 to operate, gather information with 
its sensors, and communicate stealthily with other platforms and operations 
centres can make it a potent force-multiplier, conveying targeting infor-
mation (for example) to weapons and weapons-bearing platforms safely 
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outside of the range of the enemy’s defences. Such a concept of operations 
would increase the effective range from which older, less stealthy platforms 
could operate. As Lieutenant General Nielsen has suggested, F-35 pilots 
could fill: 
 
the role of forward Battle Managers. Through enhanced command and 
control, information sharing, and decision making, the F-35 can en-
hance and leverage the capabilities of 4th generation platforms in and 
above the battlefield … This will be much the same as we saw with the 
introduction of airborne Early Warning and Control Systems (AWACS) 
and expect to see in the future with the Alliance Future Surveillance 
and Control capability.137 
 
The roles entailed in this ever-developing concept will also require extensive 
training – not only for pilots to acquire the skills, but also to assess and de-
velop the capabilities for different platform types to communicate and col-
laborate effectively with one another, to refine the tactics, techniques, and 
procedures involved, and to operate effectively with allies and partners in ac-
tual operations. 
 
 Jointness 
While the Danish acquisition of the F-35 has been criticized for having possi-
bly come at the cost of materiel investments in the Royal Danish Navy (RDN) 
and Army,138 the aircraft can facilitate joint operations at the combined level 
with NATO allies and partners, which may drive jointness at the national lev-
el. Whether jointness is achieved through combined operations with NATO 
or coalition partners or nationally, the three services can be tied together 
through the command, control, communications, and computing capabilities 
of the F-35 (and related platforms) in a US-led NATO 5th generation battle 
network. ‘The F-35 is not only an air asset; it is also a collection platform 
which can interact with, and provide data to, both ground and maritime 
forces’.139 The Norwegians,140 Australians,141 and British142 are building joint 
capabilities around their F-35s, particularly in the maritime realm. 
 With the 2018–23 Defence Agreement, the Danish government will 
transfer the primary focus of Danish defence and security policy back to the 
Baltic Sea area. For the RDN this means a shift in focus from the lower-end 
maritime security missions, such as visit, board, search and seizure opera-
tions (VBSS), fishery protection, search-and-rescue (SAR), and anti-piracy 
missions. Instead, high-end air defence, maritime interdiction, anti-
submarine warfare (ASW), mine counter-measures (MCM), sea-lane protec-
tion, and support to amphibious operations will become more important.143 
This requires investment in capabilities enhancing the combat power of the 
RDN’s frigates to include robust anti-air, anti-submarine, and anti-surface 
warfare capabilities and explains the government’s proposal to acquire ‘both 
short-range and, eventually, long-range missiles (SM2 and SM6) to counter 
hostile aircraft and several types of missiles’ and ‘fitting the Royal Danish Na-
vy’s frigates with sonar and anti-torpedo systems and its maritime helicop-
ters with dipping sonar and torpedoes to engage in anti-submarine war-
fare’.144 The same requirement is also behind the consideration of acquiring 
a strike missile capability.145 
 Yet these capabilities will not stand alone. Their integration into a net-
work of sensor data will not only make them more effective, it will be re-
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quired for them to be effective. These developments generally require an in-
creased focus on jointness in both planning and execution, together with 
the integration of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) data to 
establish a robust information infrastructure across NATO forces in the Baltic 
Sea area. The F-35’s sensors may greatly increase ISR in the region and could 
be more valuable if its information can be transmitted to, and utilized by, 
frigates and other vessels in the area of operations.146 Thus, beyond basing 
F-35Bs on the Royal Navy’s aircraft carriers, the UK and Norway each plan to 
utilize the Aegis combat systems aboard their frigates to integrate their mari-
time forces, including P-8 Poseidon maritime patrol aircraft, with the capabil-
ities of their F-35s. These capabilities are similar to those of the United States 
and will therefore form the backbone of NATO’s maritime approach to the 
North Atlantic and the Baltic Sea. Furthermore, the US Navy is developing 
the Naval Integrated Fire Control-Counter Air (NIFC-CA) system to link the 
sensors of its F-35C aircraft to a network that would then guide weapons 
launched by surface vessels, such as the Tomahawk or SM-6, to its tar-
gets.147 Placing the sensors in front of (rather than inside) the munition 
greatly reduces costs without diminishing capability – but requires the ability 
to securely plug into the sensor network to work. 
 For the Royal Danish Army (RDA), the renewed focus on the Baltic Sea 
region requires investment in capabilities that enhance the combat capabili-
ties of RDA units and eventually allow the RDA to establish a brigade-size 
unit. Such a unit will obviously require the equipment and training to inte-
grate with NATO (and hence Danish) air capabilities, particularly to coordi-
nate fires on the battlefield. Thus, its structure could include brigade air liai-
son officers, ground liaison, air–land integration cell, combat control capabil-
ity, and joint terminal attack controller capabilities. As the F-35 might likely 
be used in this theatre, these officers should be familiar with the capabilities 
of the aircraft and its systems. 
 Furthermore, as with the increase in analysis that came from the data 
collected by unmanned aerial vehicles during the wars in Iraq and Afghani-
stan, NATO nations may be hard-pressed to process the potentially increased 
intelligence data collected by the F-35’s sensor suite. The Army Intelligence 
Centre, which will form the core of a new Intelligence Battalion, or maybe a 
future joint ISR unit could provide a natural place for the Danish armed forc-
es to analyse and exploit this information, as well as sharing it with its part-
ners.148 
 
 Danish Defence Policy 
Danish defence policy is adapting to the shifts in ‘[t]he geopolitical tectonic 
plates on which Danish foreign policy has rested for many years’ at a delib-
erate pace.149 ‘Denmark faces more serious threats than in any other period 
following the fall of the Berlin Wall. The freedom and security we value so 
highly cannot be taken for granted. To the east, NATO faces a confronta-
tional and assertive Russia’, stated the Danish government in the opening 
lines of its proposal for the 2018 defence agreement.150 
 More specifically, the Danish Defence Intelligence Service (DDIS) argues 
that ‘the Baltic Sea region [is] an area of friction between Russia and 
NATO’,151 because it brings together in one region the Russian desire to be 
recognized as a great power, its aim to reverse the loss of influence and con-
trol over territories that were constituent republics of the Soviet Union, and 
the intermediate objective to undermine and deter the further integration of 
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these states into Western institutions, such as NATO and the EU. The DDIS 
judges that conflict with Russia will not directly confront NATO with military 
aggression, but may occur because Russia is willing to ‘take risks [that] in-
crease the chance for miscalculations and strategic blunders’ in pursuit of 
polices to ‘deepen divisions in the EU countries, between the EU countries 
and in the transatlantic relations’, and that aim to ‘undermine, to the widest 
possible extent, NATO’s ability to ensure the collective defence of the Baltic 
countries’.152 
 
 
 
 
As shown in Figure 3.2, Denmark’s geographical position places it ideally to 
serve as a base of operations in any crisis or high-intensity conflict with Rus-
sia over the Baltic states. Skrydstrup Air Base has two notable qualities that 
suggest that NATO planners may consider it a base of operations for the F-
35 in a Baltic contingency. First, it is notably beyond the range of Russia’s Is-
kander missiles. Furthermore, as air bases are necessarily suited for the type 
of aircraft that normally operate from them, Denmark’s forthcoming status 
as the only JSF partner nation among the Baltic Sea littoral states could make 
Skrydstrup the closest suitable air base for F-35 operations. 
 The government’s argument for acquiring SM-2 and SM-6 air defence 
missiles for the RDN frigates appears to be based on similar conjecture.153 
Further consideration of the implications is merited. At minimum, plans and 
policies from the 1980s, when the United States pre-deployed equipment to 
different RDAF bases and regularly trained the deployment of its aircraft to 
augment northern European NATO forces adjacent to the Baltic Sea, may be 
reviewed and refreshed to enhance Denmark’s contribution to NATO deter-
rence in the region. 
 
3.3 Preliminary Conclusions  
The Danish acquisition of a new combat aircraft fleet comes at a significant 
time, when it seems as though a more aggressive Russian policy in the re-
gion is not merely a transitory phenomenon. Danish defence policy seems to 
have adapted to this reality, and the adjustment will continue throughout 
the period of the current defence agreement. In this context, acquiring the 
F-35 may make Denmark a reasonable staging area for any air campaign in 
the Baltic Sea region – just as its location made it a logical place for maritime 
and air reinforcement during the Cold War. Denmark’s allies will probably 
encourage the RDAF, RDN, and RDA to consider the implications of such 
scenarios for their structures and capabilities. 
Figure 3.2:  
DDIS Assessment of Range of Rus-
sian Iskander Missiles Deployed in 
Kaliningrad  
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These policies may rest on the assumption that Denmark has invested suffi-
ciently in its F-35 fleet to have a resilient force. Such a force would imply suf-
ficient numbers of aircraft to fulfil the tasks assigned to the RDAF, sufficient 
numbers of trained and qualified pilots to fly the aircraft, sufficient numbers 
of flight engineers and technicians to maintain and sustain the aircraft and 
its operations at home and when deployed, and sufficiently robust facilities 
in which to base them. Yet the emphasis on ever-increasing levels of ‘effi-
ciency’ going back to the 1980s has not resulted in resilient military forces, 
as suggested by recent experiences with mechanics, pilots, and aircraft. The 
arrival of the F-35 represents an opportunity to do it right from the begin-
ning, to establish a firm foundation, and to set a trajectory for a resilient and 
effective air force. To that end, a number of suggestions and recommenda-
tions are presented in the next chapter. 
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Towards Implementation 
 
The Danish government has committed to the largest defence acquisition in 
its history: DKK 20 billion (approximately EUR 2.7 billion) for 27 F-35 Joint 
Strike Fighter aircraft, associated equipment, and facilities. The effort of suc-
cessive governments produced what the Rigsrevisionen called ‘thorough 
analyses and calculations’ to select the F-35 from amongst the competitors, 
to determine the number of aircraft, and to size the force structure, person-
nel, and training requirements. These decisions have been approved by the 
Danish Parliament. 
 But more remains to be done. The first task has been to conclude a fi-
nancing agreement and a contract with the US government via the JPO.154 
The more difficult decisions will concern erecting a sufficiently robust and ef-
fective institutional edifice around the aircraft. The quality of decisions made 
– or deferred – will determine whether the F-35 purchase is seen as a ster-
ling example of how major defence procurement should proceed155 or as a 
failure caused by decisions that foster incomplete implementation.156 Ac-
cepting increased risk in one area may be prudent and acceptable, but ac-
cepting increased risk across many areas multiplies risks significantly. Previ-
ous challenges that have been faced by the RDAF157 are suggestive of the 
risks involved in implementing the acquisition. The cautious and deliberate 
assessment of these risks and the appropriate planning to mitigate them 
should be encouraged along with conscientious implementation to ensure 
that in the event that technical or financial risks do eventuate that these is-
sues do not have significant political or policy consequences. 
 Thus, we offer suggestions in this chapter regarding the implementa-
tion of the F-35 programme in Denmark based on our assessment of Den-
mark’s previous experience with the F-16, the policies and plans of the Brit-
ish, Dutch, and Norwegians, as well as our own evaluation of risks, chal-
lenges, and opportunities. These suggestions range across many dimensions 
of the programme and coordinating actions between multiple stakeholders. 
The programmatics deal with building an effective institution around the F-
35 fleet to ensure that it can meet the objectives stipulated by Parliament. 
Policy issues deal with understanding how this new military capability can 
enable Denmark to meet its national security and foreign policy objectives in 
the current and future geopolitical environment. And finally, some issues 
concerning the policies necessary to implement the programme, to adapt 
defence policy to accommodate and utilize this new capability effectively, 
and to perhaps even seize opportunities that arise to advance Danish inter-
ests. 
 Our suggestions are intended to inform our audience regarding the 
possibilities to mitigate the risks that we have identified. Just as these risks 
may eventuate individually or in combination, our suggestions can be adopt-
ed individually or together; and while they address analytically distinct issues, 
they may interact with one another. We have not fully investigated these in-
teractions and their implications. 
 
 
4 
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4.1 Programmatics 
The fleet of 27 F-35 aircraft requires an effective organization with sufficient 
resources if it is to perform the functions expected by the government and 
approved by Parliament. The previous chapter discussed the different aspects 
of building such an organization: pilots, maintenance personnel, and facili-
ties. To the extent that they have been made public, the current government 
plans suggest that each of these areas has been optimized to use a mini-
mum amount of resources. Optimization implies risk should the assumptions 
upon which reduced investments are based prove incorrect. Multiple in-
stances of conditions differing from the assumptions implies further risk, 
which could entail consequences for policy and politics. The following sec-
tions address the risks and challenges inherent in acquiring enough aircraft, 
recruiting and training enough personnel, and constructing sufficient infra-
structure to achieve these objectives. 
 
 Aircraft 
For the public and decision-makers alike, the number of aircraft necessary to 
fulfil the tasks required has been a central aspect of the discussion concern-
ing the procurement decision.158 This was a central theme in a report by the 
Danish state auditors, the Rigsrevisionen, as well as a subsequent govern-
ment response prior to the approval of financing for the aircraft by the Fi-
nance Committee.159 Press reports on the negotiations detailed sizeable res-
ervations among several political decision-makers about whether 27 aircraft 
would be sufficient to accomplish the required tasks: national airspace de-
fence, national tasks, international operations, air policing, training, and ed-
ucation.160 In its report, Rigsrevisionen translated the requirements that the 
fighter fleet should meet into the flight hours it should produce each year.161 
 One factor that would not appear to have been considered in the di-
mensioning debate is the aircraft stationed for training purposes in the Unit-
ed States. Given how most of the stated training flight hours will be covered 
by these aircraft and that they will be unavailable for other missions, the ac-
tual but theoretically required average number of flight hours per aircraft 
based in Denmark might be even higher than assessed in earlier reports.162 
 The procurement decision opens up the possibility that Denmark could 
make the decision to acquire fewer aircraft for financial reasons. Given the 
Rigsrevisionen report and the preceding and subsequent debate about as-
sumptions in the dimensioning study, political decision-makers should also 
remain open to the possibility of having to acquire more aircraft in the fu-
ture. 
 Additional aircraft would obviously require additional expenditures. 
Given that the costs of infrastructure and other expenses will have already 
been paid for, Denmark would bear mainly the additional costs of each air-
craft (circa DKK 540 million/approximately EUR 72.4 million), the lifecycle 
costs of its operation (approximately DKK 2.11 billion/EUR 283 million over 
30 years),163 and the cost of personnel to operate and maintain it. As the 
dimensioning study debate has shown, lifecycle costs are also driven by fac-
tors such as pilot numbers, as these are tied to the number of aircraft and 
flight hours produced. Overall, the dimensioning debate, including the Rigs-
revisionen recommendations, indicate that political decision-makers should 
continue to follow and monitor these aspects of the F-35 programme close-
ly. 
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 Personnel and Training  
As discussed in an earlier CMS analysis, the Danish implementation of its F-
16 fleet was hampered by the recruitment and retention of inadequate 
numbers of skilled employees, especially pilots and aircraft technicians.164 In 
2014, for instance, the RDAF had approximately 50 pilots assigned to man 
the 30 operational F-16s at Skrydstrup, which exceeded the NATO standard 
of 1.5 pilots per aircraft.165 It had even more pilots available in staff positions 
and serving as instructor pilots to augment the fighter wing’s complement, if 
necessary. This level of manning came under significant stress, however, dur-
ing the 12-month deployment to Kuwait to support Operation Inherent Re-
solve in 2014–2015.166 Indeed, the MoD dimensioning study for the new air-
craft notes that the number of operational pilots assigned to fighter wing 
Skrydstrup fell between 2011 and 2014, ‘indicating that the collective up-
take of pilots has been insufficient to maintain the structure.167 
 Pilots are highly skilled employees and require significant initial and 
ongoing training to be given responsibility for very expensive aircraft that are 
used for military purposes in the name of the Danish state. These invest-
ments are expensive, and the perennial emphasis on optimizing the structure 
of the armed forces suggests that the risk of this sort of stress will not be 
eliminated. While the Finance Act of November 2017, Aktstykke nr. 31, indi-
cated that previous analyses concluded that the required number of pilots 
was 70, subsequent analyses have concluded that 62 are sufficient.168 
 Measuring the degree of risk inherent in such optimization is difficult 
for two reasons. First, the number of pilots required to adequately man a 
force is a function of the number of operational aircraft, the expected work-
load for the force, and the rules governing the employment of personnel, in-
cluding mandatory rest periods and the balance that management finds ac-
ceptable and that can be negotiated with employees.169 Second, regardless 
of the values placed on these variables, the actual pilot requirement has 
rarely been discussed openly, with actual numbers redacted in documents 
that the MoD has made public, including the Analyse af Forsvarets 
Kampflykapacitet and the Rapport fra Udvalget for Dimensionering af Nyt 
Kampfly. Alternatively, the methodology used to determine the workload 
has been obfuscated, as in the response to Parliament of 8 May 2018. What 
can be said, however, is that the smaller the pilot cadre, the greater the po-
tential impact of small deviations from the assumptions used to optimize the 
force structure. 
 The present pilot cadre is the most experienced since the introduction 
of the F-16. But this also means that many of the most experienced pilots 
may be too old to convert to the F-35.170 Ideally, most of the pilots convert-
ed to the F-35 should be able to put in at least six years of service time af-
terwards for the investment to pay dividends. If borne in mind, the age and 
experience of the current pilot cadre can be turned into an advantage. We 
suggest dividing the pilot cadre into three categories: very experienced, ex-
perienced, and less experienced. Very experienced pilots are those that will 
not remain in the fighter aircraft force after 2026. Following the Norwegian 
example, these older pilots should generally maintain the operational capa-
bility of the F-16 force until phased out and then be used in other positions 
rather than being converted to the F-35.171 Pilots in the experienced category 
should be among the vanguard that converts to the F-35 and serve as in-
structors to ensure that maximum experience is converted from the F-16 to 
the F-35. 
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Pilots who are relatively new to the force or recruited in the near future 
should train a minimum of 500 hours on the F-16 so that they can take ad-
vantage of the ‘short’ conversion course. This presumes that sufficient flight 
hours remain in the F-16 fleet to accommodate this training requirement.172 
An option worth considering is to select some of the very experienced pilots 
to join the F-35 vanguard and form a permanent cadre of instructors based 
in the US for a longer period of time to provide a more stable training pro-
gramme and to maximize the number of operational pilots at Skrydstrup 
from 2023 onwards. 
 There is a danger that the F-16 fleet cannot be managed to the degree 
necessary to ensure sufficient flight hours to meet its required tasks, let 
alone a surge in training, especially if they are committed to international 
missions beyond what is already planned. Furthermore, participation in exer-
cises risks straining the F-16 fleet beyond its remaining capacity – as well as 
beyond the capacity of the planned F-35 fleet, at least until the late 2020s. 
Limited exercise participation risks reducing the competence of RDAF pilots 
and making them less valuable in coalition operations. Shortfalls in F-16 
flight hours thus risk spilling over into multiple areas, including the phasing-
in of the F-35. 
 Maintenance personnel are also a hard requirement for a capable and 
sustainable air force. The persistent shortage of qualified flight engineers 
and technicians has impacted operations repeatedly over the past decade. 
Given the numbers needed and the time required to train them, as men-
tioned above, Denmark risks falling behind schedule to have an adequate 
number until after the full complement of aircraft arrive in 2026. Hiring, 
training, and retaining qualified technical personnel is therefore a crucial el-
ement in achieving FOC as planned. 
 
 Facilities  
All of the Danish F-35 aircraft will be based at Skrydstrup. While the process 
for determining the actual requirements for basing the F-35 there is ongo-
ing, risks and challenges clearly exist in at least three areas: hangars, noise 
levels, and security. The Finance Act 31 of November 2017 indicates that the 
government will present a request for the authority to finance the modifica-
tion of Skrydstrup once a complete plan has been prepared, which is ex-
pected in 2019.173 Here, Denmark could learn from the Norwegian experi-
ence and initiate refurbishment or construction of ‘robust’ hangar facilities 
as soon as possible. 
 Secondly, the Netherlands, Norway, and the United States have made 
significant efforts to assess the different tones and levels of noise generated 
by the F-35 to minimize the impact on surrounding communities. The gov-
ernment is considering conducting live noise assessments with F-35s at 
Skrydstrup to determine the extent of the issues to be remedied. An option 
to do this would involve inviting an F-35 user nation to deploy aircraft to 
Skrydstrup for exercises, during which time noise testing could also be con-
ducted. 
 Finally, the information-rich F-35 and the computerized facilities that 
will store and transmit its sensor, mission, and maintenance information be-
tween programme partners are particularly ripe targets for enemy espionage 
efforts. This also applies to Skrydstrup, and the facility’s security will there-
fore be an important dimension of F-35 integration on the ground. Penetrat-
ing Danish security would yield highly-classified information about the capa-
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bilities of all of Denmark’s JSF partners. To reduce the risk that Danish de-
fences may be penetrated, the physical, cyber, and electromagnetic security 
of Skrydstrup should receive the utmost attention from the MoD and DDIS. 
 
 Support and Maintenance  
Denmark’s F-16 fleet benefitted greatly from the commonality inherent in 
purchasing an aircraft that had been standardized across five European 
states and the US Air Force. This commonality permitted common upgrades, 
economies of scale in supplying spare parts, utilizing knowledge of wear and 
tear on the multinational fleet to optimize maintenance, enabled multina-
tional deployments to exercises and expeditionary operations, and even al-
lowed the sharing of weapons when the stocks of one partner were deplet-
ed.174 This cooperation was also institutionalized so that all of the partners 
were updated, shared best practices, and made decisions together on a reg-
ular basis. Despite this level of cooperation, each nation retained its own 
squadron and depot-level maintenance structures, and some variation in sys-
tems – including engines – was introduced over the lifetime of the F-16. 
These national-level structures and modifications reduced the commonality 
of the aircraft at the margins, decreased the value of the common infor-
mation for joint fleet management, and required more resources for 
maintenance and sustainment. 
 The JSF programme builds on this experience by establishing and in-
centivizing commonality across partners. Common airframes with common 
hardware and software configurations will limit, but not preclude, partners 
making distinct modifications to their aircraft – at the individual partner’s 
expense for the entirety of the costs, from research and development, to 
testing and evaluation, and to the actual acquisition and integration with the 
aircraft’s other systems. The common maintenance system, the Autonomic 
Logistics Information System (ALIS), will globalize the supply chain with in-
ternational, fleet-wide logistical contracts based on the principles of Perfor-
mance Based Logistics (PBL), and constantly update the status of the entire 
F-35 fleet across the partners. This is intended to optimize maintenance and 
sustainment operations, thereby saving money for all participants. Moreover, 
reaching agreement on regional depots for large-scale maintenance reduces 
the investment each partner must make in such structures. Denmark will not 
have any depot-level structures to maintain its F-35s, which will reduce what 
is necessary for squadron or wing-level maintenance structures and will re-
quire some adjustment in organization, practices, and expectations across all 
stakeholders. 
 
4.2 Longer-Term Planning Considerations   
Small states making major investments in their defence capabilities can sig-
nal a change in defence policy. The Danish government has recognized the 
change in its security environment. Russian assertiveness from the Black Sea 
to the Baltic combined with the reach of modern weaponry has once again 
placed Denmark on the front line. These changes informed the acquisition of 
the F-35, which will enable – and perhaps necessitate – further changes in 
defence policy. The following suggestions indicate areas where such chang-
es could take place.  
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 The F-35, NATO, and the Baltic Sea   
Skrydstrup will be a reasonable choice as the forward operating base for any 
NATO air campaign directed across the Baltic Sea. As seen in Figure 4.2, it is 
probably the best placed of the F-35 bases to deal with Baltic contingencies: 
within the unrefuelled range of the F-35 but just beyond the range of Rus-
sian Iskander missiles deployed in Kaliningrad.175 In an allied context, the 
strategic significance of Skrydstrup’s geographical location means that one 
option for Skrydstrup could be to make its facilities scalable and able to ac-
commodate and integrate a significant number of additional aircraft and 
personnel from allies and partner nations, and the practice should be exer-
cised regularly. If this is considered, Cold War-era plans for the pre-
positioning of US and NATO equipment would have to be scrutinized and 
refreshed appropriately for the current context. Exercising such plans regu-
larly with allies and partners could become a means to enhance the readi-
ness of Danish armed forces. Skrydstrup’s role in any such contingency will 
be obvious to Russian (and NATO) military planners, which should weigh 
heavily in the Danish conception of what is necessary. 
 
 
 
 
176 
 
Norway faces a similar dilemma in this regard with Ørland Main Air Station. 
Because strategic theory states that inadequate defences invite pre-emptive 
strikes, Norway is investing in ground-based air defence (GBAD) systems to 
protect its air bases from potential Russian strikes intended to destroy their 
F-35 fleet on the ground or, at minimum, disrupt operations.177 Given the 
strategic significance of Skrydstrup’s geography, the Danish government 
could consider following Norway’s example and plan for the placement of a 
NATO GBAD system on Danish territory to provide optimal protection 
against Russian strikes. Such ground-based air defences could reinforce the 
sea-based deployment of RDN SM-2 and SM-6 missiles on frigates deployed 
in the vicinity of Danish territory. 
Figure 4.2:  
F-35 Bases in Northern  
Europe 176 
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 RDAF Missions 
As indicated in the criteria used to evaluate the military effectiveness of the 
candidate aircraft, the RDAF anticipates operating in a security environment 
in which air interdiction (AI), suppression of enemy air defence (SEAD), and 
destruction of enemy air defence (DEAD) missions will be required. This sug-
gests that the RDAF is planning a long-term capability to be involved in a 
Baltic contingency requiring a high-intensity air campaign against Russian 
forces. In that context, Danish F-35s may be called upon to contribute to a 
force that will penetrate, suppress, and destroy Russian air defences in Kali-
ningrad intended to shield any aggression against NATO allies or partners in 
the eastern Baltic. 
 Missions of this type require training beyond that required for individu-
al pilots to acquire their skills. They are generally exercised in formations 
and, preferably, in ways that realistically simulate adversary capabilities.178 It 
is unlikely that they can be ‘practiced’ against Russian air defences to gain 
the ‘synergy’ between training and international operations presumed in the 
MoD’s dimensioning study.179 Thus, to the extent that RDAF missions do in-
deed evolve as indicated, two options could be explored to meet these train-
ing needs. The first is Red Flag, the USAF’s premiere adversarial training ex-
ercise. The RDAF has participated in Red Flag regularly in the past in order to 
adapt the skillsets of its pilots to new mission requirements, such as close air 
support and DEAD.180 
 The second option is to develop a regional exercise among NATO allies 
and partner states in the North Sea. Changes in how EU airspace will be 
regulated and allocated between civil and military uses will constrain the 
ability of air forces to exercise over Europe,181 while the increasing range of 
aircraft sensors requires even larger training ranges.182 This provides an op-
portunity to Denmark to take the lead to develop a regional exercise with its 
northern European F-35 partners, utilizing the airspace adjacent to Denmark 
to exercise over the North Sea. Such an exercise could differ from Red Flag in 
that it could potentially integrate the older and newer air capabilities of re-
gional allies with one another, also together with maritime assets, so as to 
develop an effective regional joint force. 
 
 Joint Integration 
In the unlikely event of a major conflict with Russia over one or more of the 
Baltic states, air forces will provide the initial response to penetrate and in-
capacitate Russian air defences in Kaliningrad to allow for NATO reinforce-
ments to fly or sail to the Baltic states. They will necessarily be assisted by 
NATO and partner maritime forces in the Baltic Sea. These forces will not on-
ly work in parallel, for example, with RDN SM-2s and SM-6s providing air de-
fence against incoming Russian missiles and aircraft, but will also work to-
gether as parts of a coherent battle network in which sensor information 
from F-35s and other platforms will be distributed to provide for a common 
operating picture and facilitate synergistic actions from allied forces. This will 
require air and maritime systems that communicate securely and stealthily 
with one another. Denmark’s frigates should be integrated into this network 
if they are to be effective. 
 Distributed operations will enable Danish forces to be joint at the na-
tional and combined levels. Jointness may be driven down to the tactical lev-
el of each ship or platform. Allied militaries are developing concepts of oper-
ation that utilize the F-35’s purported capabilities, and maritime forces will 
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necessarily be included given the strategic challenges facing the United 
States and its allies around the globe. The UK Royal Navy, the US Navy, and 
the US Marine Corps – all three services with both F-35s and maritime assets 
– will be the leading forces in developing concepts of operations, with the 
Royal Norwegian Navy paying avid attention.183 The Royal Navy will possess 
its own F-35 force, 48 F-35Bs to be deployed on the new HMS Queen Eliza-
beth and HMS Prince of Wales aircraft carriers. The Norwegians are cooper-
ating closely with the UK to integrate their F-35s and P-8 Poseidon maritime 
surveillance aircraft with their naval forces with an eye towards the Green-
land–Iceland–UK ‘gap’ (the so-called GIUK gap). 
 Given this, together with the geography of F-35s in Northern Europe, 
the naval forces of the JSF partners should clearly also be keenly interested in 
developing exercises in the North Sea area. The RDN in particular should 
therefore consider training in air–sea integration in these waters and seek 
out opportunities to train and exercise with GIUK gap regional partners – 
such as the British, Norwegians, and Dutch – in integrated air–sea opera-
tions in the North Atlantic and apply the lessons to the Baltic. Either while 
doing so or in parallel, the RDN could analyse the required modifications to 
communication, command, and control systems for its three frigates to al-
low for a seamless data integration with 5th generation fighter aircraft. The 
RDN could also contribute to developing the regional exercise discussed 
above. 
 The joint integration of the F-35 with other capabilities in the Danish 
Defence could be handled by the Defence Command Joint Study Group in 
cooperation with the neighbouring F-35 countries as they address the joint 
aspects of their F-35 capability. 
 
 Command and Control 
The operational concepts under consideration by allied militaries to utilize 
the F-35’s sensor, sensor fusion, and communications capabilities may re-
quire reconsideration of traditional notions of command and control (C2). 
These capabilities suggest that F-35 pilots may have greater situational 
awareness over a larger area of operations than the personnel who have 
traditionally collected, collated, and analysed tactical mission data in a Com-
bined Air Operations Center (CAOC), an Airborne Warning and Control Sys-
tem (AWACS) aircraft, or in another command facility or unit. Exploiting this 
level of knowledge may require decentralizing control as well as execution in 
air operations, pushing authority as well as responsibility to the lowest level 
possible (i.e., the pilot). To investigate future C2 arrangements and ensure 
an agile, flexible, and effective employment of the F-35 aircraft, the Europe-
an F-35 user nations should collectively explore the tactical, operational, stra-
tegic, political, and legal implications of distributing control to the tactical 
edge.184 
 
 Strike Capacity 
According to the Defence Agreement for 2018–23, ‘[a] potential future ac-
quisition of long-range precision guided missiles (‘strike capacity’) will be in-
vestigated through a preliminary study that will assess a possible subsequent 
acquisition in the medium term (2023–2026)’.185 While such a strike capacity 
could be ship-based with the RDN, it could also be part of the F-35 mission 
set. Although the stealth capability of the F-35 allows it to fly closer to heavi-
ly defended areas than previous fighter aircraft, including the F-16, there are 
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considerable limits to the stand-off range that can be achieved with preci-
sion-guided free-fall bombs or glide bombs that do not have a propulsion 
system. Thus, the investigation to inform a decision as to a long-range strike 
capability in the next defence agreement could include studying the possible 
acquisition of the long-range Norwegian Joint Strike Missile (JSM),186 the 
shorter-range British SPEAR 3 currently under development,187 and other al-
ternatives. 
 
4.3 Defence Policy 
Defence policy results from the balance that leaders reach between the im-
peratives imposed upon them by the challenges and opportunities of the ex-
ternal security environment and those posed by domestic constraints and 
priorities. The DDIS 2016 Intelligence Risk Assessment suggests that some 
Danish defence policies (e.g., likely participation in NATO ballistic missile de-
fence)188 have caused Russia to become ‘deeply anxious’.189 Such Russian re-
actions suggest that it could see the capabilities of advanced fighter aircraft 
with sufficient range to strike Kaliningrad from Jutland as a serious military 
threat – and plan accordingly. 
 During the period of the new Defence Agreement 2018–23, the im-
plementation of Danish defence policy could consider the equipment, per-
sonnel, infrastructure, training, exercise, and capability suggestions discussed 
above – ensuring that the RDAF possesses adequate numbers of aircraft and 
well-trained and highly skilled personnel; that the facilities at Skrydstrup are 
capable of hosting a surge of allied air forces that are well protected from air 
attacks; and that Danish forces exercise regularly with regional partners in 
scenarios that will prepare them for a high-intensity Baltic contingency. Dan-
ish defence policy during this period could transform its defence posture as 
surely as the denationalization of territorial defence and orientation towards 
expeditionary operations did after the 2004 defence agreement. This vision 
would recognize that Denmark is once again a frontline state in its own re-
gion and capitalize on the ability of high quality Danish forces to contribute 
effectively to deterring Russia from activities that could lead to a conflict. 
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Conclusion  
 
This report has analysed the experiences and plans of Denmark’s north Eu-
ropean partners in the JSF programme – the UK, the Netherlands, and Nor-
way – and provided an assessment of Denmark’s previous experience with 
the F-16. Denmark chose to acquire 27 F-35A aircraft in 2016 – three to five 
years after its neighbours made similar decisions – and there are multiple les-
sons for Denmark to consider in the coming years. We have also analysed 
how the implementation of the F-35 aircraft in Denmark provides the RDAF 
and Danish defence with new capabilities, how it offers new opportunities 
to improve jointness and regional co-operation between North European F-
35 countries, and the defence policy considerations it may require. 
 In the two years since the Danish acquisition decision, more than 300 
F-35 aircraft have been delivered to eight countries, the JSF programme has 
completed the F-35 test phase, and it is expected to move into full-rate pro-
duction in 2019.190 With the decision to replace the F-16 with the F-35, 
Denmark is not just acquiring combat aircraft per se, but rather a new mili-
tary capability. Such a military capability requires more than hardware; it re-
quires people, organization, processes, and guidance before that hardware 
becomes an operational capability with political utility. This means that focus 
will now be shifting from the aircraft itself to the pilots who are going to fly 
the planes and the maintainers that are going to keep them flyable as well 
as the facilities at Skrydstrup that will ensure operations and protect the air-
craft, all with the aim to successfully implement the F-35 into the Danish de-
fence force structure. 
 The experiences of neighbouring countries in these areas have shown 
that proactive planning involving people, processes, and facilities is of para-
mount importance. Converting from the F-16 to the F-35 will require a sub-
stantial number of RDAF pilots and technicians spending time in the US to 
be trained for the F-35, meaning that they will be unavailable for operations. 
This will result in the reduced operational capability of the RDAF fighter 
force during the entire transition period (2021–26). During this transition, 
the RDAF will be extraordinarily vulnerable to a lack of personnel. To address 
these risks, actions should therefore be taken to retain and recruit the neces-
sary number of pilots and technicians to allow for a smooth transition from 
the F-16 to the F-35. Every effort ought to be made to learn from the Dutch, 
Norwegian, and British experiences in the planning phase. Furthermore, ad-
equate facilities at Skrydstrup should be completed in due time or the 
planned transfer of aircraft, pilots, and technicians from initial training in the 
USA will have to be postponed. 
 As of 2023, when the first Danish F-35 is scheduled to arrive at 
Skrydstrup, the RDAF will gradually start to build its operational capability as 
a so-called ‘fifth-generation air force’. This means new possibilities and con-
siderations both for the RDAF and Danish Defence. The F-35 acquisition had 
the overall purpose of maintaining the capability of Denmark’s fighter force, 
and the 27 F-35 are therefore foreseen as accomplishing the same tasks as 
the 30 operational F-16 have been doing in recent years. As is known, the 
5 
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procurement decision allows Denmark to decide on acquiring fewer aircraft 
for financial reasons. However, given the Rigsrevisionen report and the pre-
ceding and subsequent debate about the assumptions in the dimensioning 
study, our contention is that political decision-makers should keep their 
minds open to the possibility of having to acquire more aircraft in the future. 
 The F-35 Joint Strike Fighter presents a number of new capabilities that 
have considerable potential to improve jointness in the Danish armed forces. 
The Royal Danish Navy would get great return on investment in seeking co-
operation with Royal Navy and the Royal Norwegian Navy to prepare for 
closer air-sea integration with a fifth-generation fighter aircraft. The location 
of North European F-35 bases around the North Sea area implies the poten-
tial to develop a regional exercise among the NATO allies and partner states 
there. This provides opportunity for Denmark to take the lead in developing 
such a regional exercise with its northern European F-35 partners, utilizing 
the airspace adjacent to Denmark to exercise over the North Sea. 
 In national and NATO operations alike, the vast F-35 sensor suite will 
provide the pilot with a higher degree of situational awareness than has 
been the case with the F-16. This means that changes to the command and 
control arrangements must be considered to exploit the intelligence, surveil-
lance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities of the F-35 effectively. Further-
more, the upcoming analysis of a future strike capability in accordance with 
the 2018 Defence Agreement would be well-suited to include a study of op-
tions for acquiring air-to-surface missiles for the F-35. 
 The Defence Agreement includes a re-orientation towards a more re-
gional focus. Here, the Danish F-35 force will be strategically well-placed to 
counter crises in the Baltic Sea region. This means that NATO plans for a re-
sponse to such a crisis will most likely have Air Base Skrydstrup as a focal 
point when it comes to air operations in the region. Plans for reinforcements 
from the Cold War period should therefore be revisited with respect to how 
Skrydstrup might function as a NATO F-35 forward operating base for a Bal-
tic contingency. This will also require analysis of how best to protect the as-
sets at Skrydstrup against physical or electronic attack. 
 All of the above recommendations require thoughtful consideration 
and leadership. The hard work required to replace the military capability of 
the Danish F-16 fleet has only just begun. 
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